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INTRODUCTION
Innovations and technological disruptions in the “sharing
economy” are shifting the contours of urban travel in the United States.
Carsharing organizations such as car2go and Zipcar have grown
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exponentially over the past decade, expanding their memberships from
52,347 in 2004 to 1,181,087 in 2015.1 Ridesourcing companies like Lyft
and Uber, which were entirely absent from most U.S. cities as recently as
2010, are now global powerhouses, each reportedly worth billions of
dollars.2 Private investors, after avoiding investments in urban transit
services for more than half a century, are now offering venture capital for
Bridj, Chariot, and other companies.
This Article explores the dynamics of “shared mobility” and the
policy issues facing the participants in that sector through a review of the
evolution of four prominent types of shared mobility providers: (1)
carsharing organizations; (2) transportation network companies such as Lyft
and Uber; (3) privately operated “microtransit” operators; and (4) crowdsourced intercity bus lines. The analytical portion of the study in Part I
describes and critiques how these sectors have evolved and summarizes the
notable legal and policy issues they face. Part II develops a typology that
categorizes their services and shows how each has disrupted the
transportation sector. The last section also offers conclusions and
suggestions for further study.
All of these shared-mobility transportation providers are
centerpieces of an app-based mobility revolution that is raising the profile
of the sharing economy, which is defined here as “the peer-to-peer-based
activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing the access to goods and services,
coordinated through community-based online service.”3 All have spurred
innovations to foster more efficient use of scarce resources and reduce
transportation, particularly in densely-populated neighborhoods with
populations seeking alternatives to private car ownership. Fueled by
changing consumer values, economic and environmental pressures, and
technological innovation, new options have emerged that allow consumers
to engage in what is commonly called “collaborative consumption.”4
Collaborative consumption is characterized by a movement of
consumers away from typical property market exchanges where consumers
purchase and own goods outright. Instead, they move to a system aided by
mobile apps in which purchases provide only temporary access to a good or
1. Susan A. Shaheen & Adam Cohen, Innovative Mobility Carsharing Outlook:
Market Overview, Analysis, and Trends, TRANSP. RES. CTR. U. CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY,
Summer 2015, at 1.
2. See From Zero to Seventy (Billion): The Accelerated Life and Times of the World’s
Most Valuable Startup, ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21706249-accelerated-life-and-times-worldsmost-valuable-startup-zero-seventy.
3. Juho Hamari, Mimmi Sjöklint, & Antti Ukkonen, The Sharing Economy: Why
People Participate in Collaborative Consumption, 67 J. ASS’N FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH., no. 9,
2016, at 2047,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255698095_The_Sharing_Economy_Why_People
_Participate_in_Collaborative_Consumption.
4. Id.
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service.5 The rise in this form of consumption, some argue, is not only the
result of changing technologies and values, but is also spurring
technological change and encouraging consumers to reassess their views on
ownership, which has historically been, as Fleura Bardhi and Giana M.
Eckhardt maintain, “the ultimate expression of consumer desire.”6 As
Koopman, Mitchell, and Thierer note, such “permissionless innovation”
fosters greater consumer choice and more comfortable, inexpensive, and
faster travel options.7 In many places where travelers once had only a few
alternatives to reach their destinations—such as taking a bus, train, or
private car—they now have an entire range of alternatives.
The challenges that the expansion of shared-mobility services pose
for municipal governments has generated a sizeable body of legal and
policy analysis.8 Some of this analysis concludes that the sector’s rise is
generating large social costs.9 One analysis makes the argument that
because transactions made in the sharing economy are motivated by
economic gain, mediated by third parties, and take place among buyers and
sellers that do not know each other, they are not really “sharing” at all.10
Regardless, the rise of shared mobility creates a pressing need for additional
consideration of the way this sector operates and the many disruptions now
occurring in urban transportation.

I. TYPES OF SHARED-MOBILITY SERVICES
Although the analysis below identifies four major types of sharedmobility providers prevalent in urban areas, it all shows that, despite all the
variety, two distinct business models have emerged: peer-to-peer and
business-to-consumer.
Peer-to-Peer Business Model: Firms using this model provide a
technological platform on which a “membership community” shares access
to other members’ properties. Pioneered by eBay, this model is typically
coupled with rating systems for consumers and suppliers, thereby
5. Id. at 2050.
6. Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car
Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881, 881 (2012).
7.
Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell, & Adam Thierer, The Sharing
Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 540 (2015).
8. See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government
Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy”, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901,
903 (2015); see Koopman, Mitchell, & Thierer, supra note 7; see Andrew T. Bond, Note, An
App for That: Local Governments and the Rise of the Sharing Economy, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 77 (2015).
9. See Brishen Rogers, Note, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE
85 (2015).
10. See Giana M. Eckhardt & Fleura Bardhi, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About
Sharing at All, HARVARD BUS. REV. ONLINE, (Jan. 28, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/thesharing-economy-isnt-about-sharing-at-all.
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eliminating the so-called “lemon problem” that can be pervasive when
buyers and sellers have asymmetric information about quality.11 The
efficiencies of having all transactions occur on one platform have allowed
for extraordinarily fast expansion at some firms. Among the notable
examples are carsharing companies Getaround and Turo and ridesourcing
providers Lyft and Uber, all of which have sophisticated systems of using
independent contracting for drivers.12 Firms using this model avoid the cost
of complexity in having to own and maintain vehicles, which dramatically
reduces the capital outlays needed to expand.
Business-to-Consumer Models: This model generally involves
providing both a communication platform and directly providing vehicles
and other equipment needed for transportation, which in many cases is a
vehicle that is temporarily turned over to a member. Firms in this category
generally provide access to company-owned vehicles. Notable examples are
the carsharing companies car2go and ZipCar, bikesharing programs, scooter
rental firms like Scoot, and Microtransit providers such as Bridj and
Chariot.
The analysis begins with consideration of carsharing, followed by
an overview of transportation network companies, “microtransit”
operations, and crowd-sourced intercity bus lines.

A. Carsharing
Carsharing is a system of car rentals in which people can rent
vehicles for short periods, often by the hour or mile. Firms in this sector
generally operate on a membership-based model, which typically entails
paying an annual fee that provides automatic insurance coverage to
motorists. Several aspects of carsharing make it different from conventional
car renting: cars are available only to members; members are required to
return a clean vehicle by the agreed-upon time, lest they have their
membership revoked; carsharers do not enter a separate contract every time
with each use, but instead are billed by usage volume; and carsharers are
generally required to fill up when the gasoline tank runs low—a burden
generally eased by making a credit card available inside the car.

11. See Xiang Hui et al., Reputation & Regulations: Evidence from eBay, 62 MGMT.
SCI., no. 12, December 2016,
http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2323; see generally George A.
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.
J. ECON. 488 (1970).
12. See Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory
Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 293 (2016).
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1. Evolution and Expansion.
Carsharing has enjoyed remarkable expansion since it first attracted
significant policymaker attention in the late 1990s. Although informal
forms of carsharing have been around for at least a half-century, Car
Sharing Portland is widely regarded as the country’s first large-scale
program, establishing a strong presence in Oregon’s largest city starting in
1998.13 Drawing upon the lessons of carsharing in Canada and Europe, this
pioneering nonprofit, like most early entrants, emphasized a “neighborhood
residential model” with pods largely concentrated in densely-populated
housing areas as well as having cars available in a city’s downtown
district.14 As this operator gained a loyal following in the Portland market,
many others came onto the scene in other U.S. cities, often with nonprofit
charters.15 With local governments actively working to promote carsharing,
many specialty locations emerged, including pods at government facilities,
airports, and universities, giving this sector even greater visibility.16 By
2008, carsharing had a foothold in dozens of smaller cities and suburbs
across the country.17
During their formative years, carsharing organizations conducted
extensive research to underscore their unique value to the community.
Many sought to meet the formal definitions for “carsharing organizations,”
which required them to document their commitment to civic-minded goals
and neighborhood improvements—requirements that only some were able
to meet.18 Those meeting this definition were often rewarded with a
heightened ability to negotiate with local governments for much-needed
resources, such as vacant property and on-street spots for vehicle parking,
as well as technical assistance. Some organizations received grants from
philanthropic organizations to fund expansion into low-income
neighborhoods and other poorly-served areas.
Gradually, however, this sector acquired a more “big business”
character dominated by a few large national or global players.19 The supply
of cars became increasingly dominated by private sector providers,
including Zipcar, which grew into the country’s largest for-profit provider
13. Richard Katzev, Carsharing: A New Approach to Urban Transportation
Problems, 3 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES AND PUB. POL’Y 65, 68 (2003).
14. Alice Biesczat & Joseph B. Schwieterman, Are Taxes On Carsharing Too High: A
Review of the Public Benefits and Tax Burden of an Expanding Transportation Sector,
CHADDICK INST. FOR METROPOLITAN DEV. DEPAUL U., June 28, 2011, at 4.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Adam Millard-Ball et al., Carsharing: Where and How It Succeeds, TRANSIT
COOPERATIVE RES. PROGRAM, REP. 108, 2005, at 2-3.
19. See Chris Brown, CarSharing: State of the Market and Growth Potential,
AUTORENTAL NEWS (Mar./Apr. 2015), http://www.autorentalnews.com/channel/rentaloperations/article/story/2015/03/carsharing-state-of-the-market-and-growth-potential.aspx.
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and became known for its aggressive advertising and expansion. The
Boston-based company went public in 2011 before being acquired by Avis
Budget Group in 2013.20 As a subsidiary of the larger Avis Budget Group,
Zipcar provides vehicles for hourly or daily use in over thirty major metro
markets and at over 500 college campuses worldwide.21 Zipcar now reports
having more than 10,000 vehicles in its worldwide fleet.22 The company’s
website, symbolic of most car sharing companies, touts the slogan “Own
the trip, not the car.”23
Zipcar has also worked to push the technological frontier, providing
members access to its vehicles using a sensor-embedded card that unlocks
the vehicle’s doors.24 “Zipsters” are able to select among several insurance
options and have access to vehicles ranging from Mini Coopers to cargo
vans.25 Mileage is restricted to 180 miles per day with fuel included.26
Originally, Zipcar required members to travel round-trip, returning the car
to the same pod in which it was picked up, but the company recently began
experimenting with one-way trips within a city, allowing cars to be dropped
off at any designated company pod.27 Hourly access rates average around
nine dollars, location dependent.28
The second largest U.S. operator, Enterprise CarShare, has vehicles
available in twenty-eight U.S. cities.29 Enterprise houses many of its cars at
its vast network of neighborhood car rental locations but keeps the process
of reserving a carsharing vehicle distinct from regular car rentals.30 While
Car2go allows cars to be reserved on a per-minute basis,31 Enterprise only

20. Shawn Langhois, Zipcar Zooms 56% Higher in IPO, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 14,
2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/zipcar-zooms-60-higher-in-ipo-2011-04-14; Avis
Budget Group Completes Acquisition of Zipcar, AVIS BUDGET GROUP (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://ir.avisbudgetgroup.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=748594.
21.Zipcar Overview, ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/press/overview (last visited Mar.
29, 2017).
22. Welcome to Zipcar, ZIPCAR, www.zipcar.com/communitycar (last visited Mar. 29,
2017).
23. ZIPCAR, www.zipcar.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
24. How does Zipcar Work?, ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/how (last visited Apr.
16, 2017).
25. Id.
26. What’s Included, ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/how/whatsincluded/cofc (last
visited Mar. 29, 2017).
27. Billy Steel, Zipcar Tests Pay-Per Miles Pricing for Short Trips, ENGADGET (June
28, 2016), http://www.engadget.com/2016/06/28/zipcar-tests-pay-per-mile.
28. Joseph P. Schwieterman & Alice Biesczat, A Review of the Changing Prices and
Taxation Levels for Neighborhood Carsharing in the United States: 2011 – 2016 (Nov.
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
29. ENTERPRISE CARSHARE, https://www.enterprisecarshare.com/us/en/home.html (last
visited Mar. 29, 2017).
30. Our Story, ENTERPRISE CARSHARE, https://www.enterprisecarshare.com/us/en/ourstory.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
31. How Much does car2go Cost?, CAR2GO,
https://www.car2go.com/US/en/portland/how/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
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allows cars to be reserved on a per-hour basis;32 and, unlike Zipcar, which
provides worldwide access,33 Enterprise generally provides members access
to vehicles in one city.34
Ranking third in size in this country—but regarded as the largest
carsharing company in the world due to its international operations—is
car2go, which has expanded beyond its home city of Austin, Texas, to six
other U.S. cities.35 This company emphasizes short one-way trips, with
many of its consumers using its cars for trips spanning just a few minutes,
hopping in for a quick drive and leaving the car at an on-street parking spot
near their destination.36 In some cities, users are allowed to leave cars at any
publicly available parking spot, including spaces that are metered.37
The recent expansion of car2go, a subsidiary of Daimler AG, has
drawn attention to a major move by automotive companies into
carsharing.38 Auto companies see having a stake in this niche as an
incremental step toward preparing themselves for changing business
practices coming—the eventual widespread deployment of autonomous
vehicles, which some analysts maintain is only a decade away.39 Audi,
BMW, Ford, and General Motors, following Daimler’s lead, invested
heavily in U.S. carsharing brands.40 Some (including BMW’s ReachNow)
are experimenting with such sophisticated techniques as pay-per-minute
pricing that differentiate between time spent driving versus parked.41
Keeping a lower profile in this high-stakes game are many smaller
providers that are largely confined to individual cities. These include:
Buffalo CarShare, City CarShare (San Francisco, California), eGo CarShare
(Denver, Colorado), Hourcar (Chicago, Illinois), and CarHopper (multiple
cites).38 Several are working to expand the availability of one-way
carsharing, which, as previously noted, is administratively complex but
gives users more flexibility and is seen as a “must” to meet the rising
expectations of consumers.39 At some companies, such as Indianapolis’s
32. FAQ, ENTERPRISE CARSHARE, https://www.enterprisecarshare.com/us/en/faq.html
(last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
33. How does Zipcar Work?, ZIPCAR, https://www.zipcar.com/how (last visited Apr.
16, 2007).
34. FAQ, ENTERPRISE CARSHARE,
https://www.enterprisecarshare.com/us/en/faq.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
35. Your New Ride[s], CAR2GO, https://www.car2go.com/US/en/#152743 (last visited
Mar. 29, 2017).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. car2go, DAIMLER, https://www.daimler.com/products/services/mobilityservices/car2go/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
39. Jared Lindzon, Why Auto Makers Encourage Car Sharing Despite Trend Away
from Ownership, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 25, 2015).
40. Schwieterman & Biesczat, supra note 28, at 3.
41. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 4.

116

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1: 1

BlueIndy, electric vehicles circulate freely, allowing members to pick up
cars at on-street parking spots with charging stations and drop them off at
any electricity-equipped spot they choose.42
The past several years have seen particularly rapid growth in peerto-peer carsharing, which allows users to rent cars owned by individuals
living nearby. Among the largest entities in this category is Getaround,
which now operates in the San Francisco Bay Area; Portland, Oregon;
Chicago; and Washington, D.C.43 This firm emphasizes, in a manner
similar to Zipcar, that it reduces the need to own a personal vehicle.44 The
company’s research indicates that, “Sharing your car on Getaround takes
ten cars off the road.”45
Getaround reduces the legal issues associated with allowing
members to rent their private cars to another member by offering insurance
as part of every transaction, as well as extensive customer service.46 It also
restricts car use to round-trip journeys and limits travel to 200 miles per
day.47 Unlike those using Zipcar and other neighborhood carsharing
companies, users are responsible for their own fuel costs.48 Vehicle owners
independently set their own hourly or daily rates for use of their cars,
resulting in considerable fluctuation in prices from place to place.49 In some
markets, hourly rates range from a low of six dollars for small cars to sixty
dollars for specialty vehicles, while the most common daily rates are often
around forty dollars.50 Some vehicles have designated parking spaces—
perhaps in the owner’s driveway—but street parking is more common.51

2. Notable Research
Carsharing has generated much more research than the other three
sectors considered in this study. Much of this research focuses on

42. Ready to BlueIndy? Follow the guide!, BLUEINDY, https://www.blueindy.com/how-does-it-work (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
43. GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
44. Why Getaround, GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/tour (last visited Mar.
29, 2017).
45. Benefits of Sharing your Car, GETAROUND,
https://www.getaround.com/tour/benefits (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
46. Why Getaround, GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/tour (last visited Mar.
29, 2017).
47. Is There A Mileage Cap?, GETAROUND, https://help.getaround.com/hc/enus/articles/204371464-Is-there-a-mileage-cap- (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
48. Who Pays For Gas?, GETAROUND, https://help.getaround.com/hc/enus/articles/204371454-Who-pays-for-gas- (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
49. Fee and Commission Schedule, GETAROUND,
https://www.getaround.com/terms/fees (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
50. Id.
51. Parking, GETAROUND, https://help.getaround.com/hc/en-us/sections/200788784Parking (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
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carsharing’s environmental, economic, and social benefits.52 The benefits
are particularly significant with respect to reducing social costs linked to
private vehicle operation, such as air pollution, congestion, and vehicle
accidents.53
Urban planners take particular interest in the growing body of
evidence indicating that carsharing promotes active lifestyles by
encouraging more walking and biking.54 By reducing the amount of land
that is devoted to both on-street and off-street parking, carsharing can also
help foster improved open space and public safety.55 The criticism that
carsharing makes automobile travel easier, thus encouraging a cardependent lifestyle, has been countered by research showing that carsharing
tends not to substantially reduce the use of public transit.56 This
phenomenon is often attributed to the tendency for those sharing cars to
make decisions differently than those who have large “sunk” investments in
a private vehicle.57 Since they pay for every trip, they use buses and trains
more regularly than vehicle owners, who often view the incremental cost of
driving as little more than the fuel.58
Comparatively less research exists on the cost of carsharing for
consumers, although several studies have surveyed consumers about the
importance of cost in their decision to purchase a carshare membership.59
This research suggests that many consumers are quite sensitive to price.60
After evaluating membership fees of more than two-dozen carsharing
organizations, Shaheen, Cohen, and Roberts conclude that keeping prices
low is an important factor that can spur growth.61 Schwieterman and
Biesczat show that the per-hour cost of carsharing fell by about five percent
between 2011 and 2016, but rising taxes have offset about a third of this
drop.62 When adjusted for inflation, these researchers show that prices have
52. See Elliot Martin & Susan Shaheen, Impacts of Car2Go on Vehicle Ownership,
Modal Shift, Vehicle Miles Traveled, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Analysis of Five
North American Cities, TRANSP. RES. CTR. U. CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, Jul. 2016.
53. See Millard-Ball et al., supra note 18.
54. See Todd Litman, Evaluating Carsharing Benefits, TRANSP. RES. REC., Sept. 17,
2015, at 31-32.
55. See Donald Shoup, The High Cost of Free Parking, 17 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 3
(1997).
56. See Elliot Martin & Susan Shaheen, Greenhouse Gas Emission Impacts of
Carsharing in North America, 12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS., no. 4,
Dec. 2011.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See Cindy Costain, Carolyn Arddron, & Khandker Nurul Habib, Synopsis of
Users’ Behavior of a Carsharing Program: A Case Study in Toronto, DEP’T CIVIL ENG’G U.
TORONTO (Jan. 2012).
60. Id.
61. Susan Shaheen, Adam P. Cohen, & J. Darius Roberts, Carsharing in North
America: Market Growth, Current Developments, and Future Potential, U. CAL. DAVIS INST.
TRANSP. STUDIES, 2005, at 14.
62. Schwieterman & Biesczat, supra note 28, at 6.
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dropped by more than ten percent, making carsharing more affordable than
in previous years.63
The falling price of carsharing, they argue, follows a pattern that is
pervasive among “infant industries” that launch services using an
experimental business model and gradually benefit from heightened
technical sophistication and economies of scale.64 Indeed, carsharing, with
its emphasis on short-hop urban trips and a high rate of vehicle utilization,
has proven to be an effective way to experiment with electric vehicles and
smaller cars that achieve high fuel efficiency.65

3. Policy Issues and Outlook.
Of the four mobility groupings considered in this study, carsharing
faces the fewest policy hurdles. This is due, in part, to its legal classification
as a “rental” rather than a “service.”66 This allows the sector to sidestep
some of the thorny issues associated with the regulation of transportation
services. Accordingly, the sector generally does not face challenges about
whether it is violating governmental rules about the procedures that need to
be followed and permits needed before launching transportation services,
which in some locales casts a pall over Lyft, Uber, and microtransit
operators.67
Peer-to-peer carsharing faces somewhat more vexing legal
problems due to still unresolved insurance issues related to the legal
liability of driving other peoples’ private cars.68 This problem is severe
enough that it prompted RelayRides to withdraw from the state of New
York.69 Nevertheless, in most states, these issues are gradually being
resolved and do not pose an existential threat to the sector.
At the same time, all forms of carsharing face the specter of rising
retail taxes.70 In fact, the taxes these operators face is in many cities higher
than nearly every other sector of the economy.71 Despite the fact that many
other sectors of the sharing economy are not taxed at the retail level, this
sector faces the almost universal requirement that carsharers pay all taxes

63. Id.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Shaheen, Cohen, & Roberts, supra note 61, at 3.
66. Millard-Ball et al., supra note 18, at 6-10.
67. Joseph P. Schwieterman & Heather Spray, When Sharing is Taxing: Comparing
the Tax Burden on Carsharing Services in Major U.S. Cities, CHADDICK INST. FOR
METROPOLITAN DEV. DEPAUL U. (July 21, 2016) at 3.
68. See Carsharing: The Legality of An Innovative Industry, MOISAN LEGAL P.C.
BLOG (Feb. 12, 2016), http://moisanlegal.com/lawyer/2016/02/12/Recent-News/CarsharingThe-Legality-of-an-Innovative-Industry_bl23539.htm.
69. Id.
70. Schwieterman & Spray, supra note 67, at 3.
71. Id.
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that are paid by users of conventional car rental services.72 This often adds
more than twenty percent to the cost of many reservations.73 The authors
are aware of only three states—Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Oregon—where
concessions have been made for carsharing.74 The applicability of
transaction-based (lump-sum) taxes, such as add-on fees to pay for sports
stadiums and convention centers, is particularly significant in many
locales.75 These often add two to four dollars to even the shortest carsharing
trip.76 As a result, in many cities, users face tax rates that are several times
the sales tax rate, despite the apparent desire of many local governments to
have carsharing grow.
Schwieterman and Spray have computed the average tax on various
sectors of the economy.77 This research shows that carsharing faces retail
taxes only slightly higher than two-day neighborhood car rentals and airline
travel, but far higher than all of the other sectors considered, including
hotels rooms, general retail merchandise (subject to sales taxes), and
ridesourcing operators like Lyft and Uber, which generally are not subject
to retail taxes (Figure 1).78

FIGURE 1
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72. Id.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 9, 11; See Hawaii Carsharing Tax, January 2015, TAXRATES.COM,
http://www.taxrates.com/blog/2014/06/26/hawaii-car-sharing-tax-january-2015/ (last visited
Sept. 2, 2016).
75. Schwieterman & Spray, supra note 67, at 3.
76. Id. at 2.
77. Schwieterman & Spray, supra note 67, at 16.
78. Id.
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This research also provides evidence that carsharing is being
affected by rising competition from largely untaxed “ridesourcing”
services, which often provide transportation at lower cost. Carsharing also
faces rising competition from traditional car rental services, which, in some
locales, now offer hourly rentals.79
These implications are amplified by recent research suggesting that
the growth of the carsharing sector has stalled.80 Between 2013 and 2014,
the number of available carsharing vehicles (not including peer-to-peer
vehicles) increased from 16,811 to 19,115.81 From the end of that period
through early 2015, however, available vehicles dropped to 16,754.82
Although some of this 11.7% decline may be due to seasonal issues related
to the timing of the counts, a concurrent drop in the number of carsharing
members suggests that neighborhood carsharing, at a minimum, is no longer
poised for the rapid expansion that has been long associated with this
sector.83
A final issue affecting the carsharing sector is the apparent
diminished interest from local governments in providing favorable parking
spots.84 This shift in the sector’s status from one dominated by nonprofit
providers to one dominated by large for-profit firms owned by international
conglomerates has led to a belief that these firms can afford to pay market
rates for parking—despite evidence highlighting the mounting competition
this sector faces.85

B. Transportation Network Companies
Transportation network companies (“TNCs”) are entities that use “a
digital network to connect riders to drivers for the purposes of prearranging and providing transportation.”86 The largest companies in this
category, Lyft and Uber, have networks across the world to connect riders

79. Biesczat & Schwieterman, supra note 14, at 6.
80. Shaheen & Cohen, supra note 1, at 2.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. For a summary of vehicle and membership declines, see Martin & Shaheen, supra
note 52.
84. Millard-Ball et al., supra note 18, at 6-11.
85. Stephanie Steinberg & Bill Vlasic, Car-Sharing Services Grow, and Expand
Options, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/business/car-sharing-services-grow-and-expandoptions.html.
86. An Act Establishing Dep’t of Pub. Utilities Oversight of Transp. Network
Companies, H3351, 189th Leg (Mass. 2015), available at
http://www.mass.gov/governor/legislationexecorder/legislation/oversight-of-transportationnetwork-companies.html.
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and drivers.87 These services in many ways resemble high-tech taxicab
operations and have been reviewed critically by many local governments
that have regulated cab fares and service levels for decades.88
The lexicon used to describe this sector can be somewhat
confusing. “Ride hailing” and “real-time ridesharing” are both used to
describe the mobile application-based services of TNCs.89 In this study, the
term “ridesourcing” is deemed most appropriate. As Rayle, Dai, Chan,
Cervero, and Shaheen observe, this term captures the basic platform
involving a pool of drivers and a means of “sourcing” rides.90 Regardless of
what term or phrase is used, however, some ambiguities remain. For
example, it is important to acknowledge that some of the same “sourcing”
features used by TNCs are also used by taxi companies, which are not
regarded as part of this sector.91

1. Evolution and Expansion.
In the most basic sense, some form of ridesourcing has been around
for years. Airport shuttles run by hotels often dynamically change their
routes based on their guests’ requests. Many jitney operators have long
provided a flexible route service based on requests for pickups.92 Still, the
level of customer awareness and sophistication of ridesharing has grown
exponentially in the past six years.93
Uber, after launching in many U.S. cities in 2010, quickly grew to
encompass five distinct services.94 Most consumers are familiar with
UberX, which is akin to an app-based taxi that connects passengers to local
drivers who respond to pickup requests.95 Passengers are taken straight to
their destinations without additional passenger pickups or drop-offs. When
many say, “let’s Uber it,” they are often referring to this service.
Gradually, Uber differentiated from its original offering. For groups
needing larger vehicles with room for up to six people, UberXL has become
widely available.96 A more luxurious service, UberBLACK, offers black
87. Susan Shaheen et al., App-Based, On Demand Ride Services: Comparing Taxi and
Ridesourcing Trips and User Characteristics in San Francisco (Nov. 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), https://www.its.dot.gov/itspac/dec2014/ridesourcingwhitepaper_nov2014.pdf.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Matthew Mitchell & Michael Farren, If You Like Uber, You Would’ve Loved the
Jitney, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mitchelljitneys-uber-ride-share-20140713-story.html.
93. Schwieterman & Biesczat, supra note 28, at 6.
94. Uber’s Founding, UBER NEWSROOM (Dec. 22, 2010),
https://newsroom.uber.com/ubers-founding/.
95. Alexander DeMasi, Uber: Europe’s Backseat Driver for the Sharing Economy, 7
CREIGHTON INT’L AND COMPARATIVE L.J. 73, 75 (2016).
96. Id.
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vehicles that are relatively new and feature black leather interiors.97 Slightly
less costly is UberSELECT, which offers luxury transportation without
assurances that the vehicle will be black.98 Another top-of-the-line option is
UberLUX, which offers the guarantee of being picked up in a BMW 7Series, Mercedes Benz S-Class, or other high-end luxury vehicle.99
Lyft has followed a similar growth trajectory, starting in San
Francisco and gradually expanding throughout the United States and
abroad.100 In 2016, the company invested heavily in growing LyftPremier, a
luxury version of its “classic” service that is similar to UberBLACK.101
Lyft has reported that sixty percent of its customers have requested a luxury
vehicle at least once.102
Among the most significant strategic initiatives by these firms in
recent years has been the development of LyftLine and UberPOOL.103
These services, through an evaluation of a rider’s origin and destination
compared to the origins and destinations of nearby customers, allow the
same driver to pick up multiple riders in one multipurpose trip.104 Along
many of these routes, which are often broadly described as “ride-splitting,”
the services are priced only a few dollars more than public transit service.105
After beta-testing UberPOOL in San Francisco, Uber formally
launched the service in many cities in August 2014—its first widely
available service in which several travel parties shared one vehicle at the
same time.106 Logan Green, Chief Operating Officer of Lyft, was reportedly
inspired by a carpooling service in Zimbabwe before developing LyftLine,
which also launched in mid-2014 with a similar goal of keeping costs low
by building efficiencies into the system and matching riders headed in the
same direction.107 Both Lyft and Uber stand out for bundling attractive
features into an easily accessible app-based service that has dramatically
97 Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Ryan Lawler, Lyft Hits the East Coast with a Launch in Boston, its First Big PostFunding Expansion City, TECH CRUNCH (May 31, 2013),
https://techcrunch.com/2013/05/31/lyft-boston/.
101. Jordan Golson, Premier is Lyft’s Answer to Uber Black, THE VERGE (July 7,
2016), www.theverge.com/2016/7/7/12119030/lyft-premier-luxury-car-uber-black.
102. Id.
103. Meet Lyft Line, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/line (last visited Mar. 31, 2017);
uberPOOL, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/uberpool/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Announcing UberPool, UBER, https://newsroom.uber.com/announcing-uberpool/
(last visited March 31, 2017); Karyne Levy, Uber Has A New Way To Make Your Ride Even
Cheaper, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 5, 2014, 8:37 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/uberpool-cheaper-rides-2014-8.
107. Ellen Huet, The Case For Carpooling: Inside Lyft and Uber’s Quest To Squeeze
More People In The Backseat, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2015),
www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/08/18/inside-lyfts-and-ubers-carpooling-questuberpool-lyft-line/#499dace111a5.
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expanded carpooling’s availability and geographic reach. Initially, both
companies deeply subsidized these services, offering discounts to
encourage riders to try them out.108
Customers can access these new ride-splitting services by opening
the app on a smartphone and inputting his or her location and destination.
The app then displays two prices—a traditional rate and a discounted rate if
you choose to pool, which is as much as twenty-five percent less costly than
a private ride (the pool option is now the default choice in the Uber app,
which has resulted in some riders choosing to share their ride without
realizing it).109 In this case, the rate quoted to the travel party depends on
the number of passengers. Once the user chooses the pool option, a driver is
assigned to them.110 The user may be the second or third pickup on a trip or
the only rider, though they are not made aware of this at the time the
reservation is made.111
A related service offered by these companies matches commuters
who travel to the same destination but are otherwise uninterested in making
shared-ride trips over the course of the day. UberCommute and Lyft
Carpool are both attempting to achieve such “carpool facilitation” through
their mobile apps.112 Presently, however, both services are in an embryonic
form. In fact, Lyft recently suspended its carpool operation due to lack of
driver interest.113
A variety of other firms have been operating in the carpooling
facilitation space for longer periods, with Scoop among the most prominent.
Scoop’s motto is to “replace solo driving with shared commuting,” thus
reducing single occupancy vehicle trips and even vehicle ownership.114 Like
most other firms in the sharing economy, this start-up provides only the
communication platform and does not own or lease vehicles.115 It stands
out, however, for marketing heavily to employers rather than using the
more traditional direct-to-consumer approach.116 Interested employers
cultivate awareness among employees in order to generate enough interest

108. Id.
109. Joseph P. Schwieterman & Matthew Michel, Have App Will Travel: Comparing
the Price & Speed of Fifty CTA & UberPool Trips in Chicago, CHADDICK INST. FOR
METROPOLITAN DEV. DEPAUL U. (June 27, 2016) at 2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 12 n.1.
113. See Faiz Siddiqui, Lyft ditches casual carpooling, citing lack of driver interest,
WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/drgridlock/wp/2016/08/24/lyft-ditches-casual-carpooling-citing-a-lack-of-driver-interest/.
114. About Scoop, INSIDE SCOOP, https://takescoop.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited
Mar. 30, 2017).
115. SCOOP, https://www.takescoop.com/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
116. Scoop for Business, SCOOP, https://www.takescoop.com/partners (last visited Mar.
31, 2017).
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to make Scoop carpools possible.117 Scoop is also notable for guaranteeing
your ride home, thereby eliminating the concern about needing to leave the
office by a certain time.118 Many users “blend” modes by taking public
transit or a ridesharing service in one direction and Scoop in the other.
Scoop carpools are launched only on routes that have achieved a
critical mass of demand. This is generally met when 250 people have
expressed interest between geographically similar home and work
locations.119 Once achieved, Scoop then launches the route. Recent
expansion has led to services beyond the San Francisco Bay Area and into
other metropolitan regions, with new routes reportedly being added daily.
Scoop touts surge-free pricing and a ten dollar cap on every ride.120 On its
popular route from Palo Alto to San Francisco, for example, riders pay
about $7 and the driver receives about $6 per rider.121 This compares
favorably to CalTrain commuter service, which costs $7.75 one way.122

2. Notable Research.
Research on the carpooling sector is far less developed than that on
carsharing. However, in response to the enormous interest in Lyft and Uber
from both the general public and transportation agencies, researchers are
rapidly filling the void. Among the most notable studies, Shared Mobility
and the Transformation of Public Transit, a publication of the Shared-Use
Mobility Center in partnership with the American Public Transit
Association, draws upon survey data from more than 4,500 users across the
United States.123 This study shows that travelers inclined to take shared-use
modes including bikesharing, carsharing, and ridesourcing are also more
likely to use public transit than their non-sharing counterparts.124 These
sharers have a tendency to own fewer cars and blend different modes to

117. Lora Kolodny, Scoop Gets Bay Area Cities to Pick Up the Tab for Carpooling to
Alleviate Traffic Jams, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/04/scoop-gets-bay-area-cities-to-pick-up-the-tab-forcarpooling-to-alleviate-traffic-jams/.
118. SCOOP, https://www.takescoop.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
119. Get Scoop Even Sooner: “Connect Your Commute” Launches, SCOOP (Apr. 19,
2016), https://blog.takescoop.com/get-scoop-even-sooner-connect-your-commute-launchesecf49597ff67.
120. FAQ, SCOOP, https://takescoop.zendesk.com/hc/en-us (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
121. Connect your Commute, SCOOP, https://route.takescoop.com (last visited Mar. 30,
2017).
122. See Fare Chart, CALTRAIN, http://www.caltrain.com/Fares/farechart.html (last
visited March 3, 2017).
123. Shared Mobility and the Transformation of Public Transit, SHARED USE MOBILITY
CENTER, March 2016, at 6,
https://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/APTA-SharedMobility.pdf.
124. Id.
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meet their needs.125 Furthermore, “supersharers” live in households that
average only half as many cars as those public transit users who are less
reliant on shared-use modes.126 Only about one in five shared-use travelers
(twenty-one percent) use ridesourcing to commute, while a mere seven
percent use it daily, suggesting that most shared use is situational in
nature.127
The Shared Use Mobility study paints a compelling portrait about
the manner in which shared mobility can support enhancements to public
transit. Nonetheless, the study offers several warnings about the
implications of ridesourcing for transit. Ridesharers tend to be more
“automobile-centered” than those reliant on other shared-use modes.128
More than a third (thirty-four percent) indicated they would use a private
automobile (either alone or with a friend) if ridesourcing wasn’t available,
while just fourteen percent would use a bus or train.129 Ridesourcers are less
inclined to live “transit-oriented” lifestyles than carsharers.
Another notable work, a 2016 survey by Rayle, Dai, Chan,
Cervero, and Shaheen, conducted “intercept surveys” of several thousand
ridesourcing and taxicab customers taking trips in the San Francisco
market.130 This analysis illustrates the extent to which ridesourcing is filling
demand that was previously unmet. Wait times are found to be markedly
shorter for ridesourcing than taxis, and customers are found to generally shy
away from taxi use, which suggests that many ridesourcing trips are newly
generated.131 Ridersharers tend to be younger, own fewer vehicles, and be
more likely to travel with companions.132 Among the study’s most basic
findings, therefore, is that TNCs and taxis tend to serve different markets.133
Like the Shared-Use Mobility Center study, it also indicates that
ridesourcing tends to support car-free lifestyles and thus is largely
complementary to transit use.134
The revenue model used by ridesourcing and the taxation issues
this sector faces are explored by Oie and Ring.135 This study evaluates
Uber’s emphasis on dynamic price adjustments in response to supply and
125. Id. at 3-4.
126. Id. at 7.
127. Id. at 15.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Shared Mobility and the Transformation of Public Transit, SHARED USE MOBILITY
CENTER, at 16 (March 2016),
https://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/APTA-SharedMobility.pdf.
130. Lisa Rayle et al., Just a better taxi? A survey-based comparison of taxis, transit,
and ridesourcing services in San Francisco, 45 TRANSP. POL’Y 168 (2016).
131. Id. at 173.
132. Id. at 176.
133. Id. at 177.
134. Id. at 176.
135. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989,
989 (2016).
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demand shifts, and notes that “surge pricing” is determined through
algorithms based heavily on variations in wait times.136 Fares are increased,
often dramatically, when the number of unfulfilled requests grows, which
happens regularly on Friday and Saturday nights, on holidays, and during
inclement weather.137
Oie and Ring also described the negative public reaction to surge
pricing and how this has spurred the expansion of competing services, most
notably Gett, which does not change prices in response to demand
fluctuations.138 Oie and Ring note that, due to Uber’s practice of including a
twenty percent gratuity in its fares, for several years Uber stressed to
customers that additional tips were unnecessary.139 This, in turn, stoked
dissatisfaction among Uber’s drivers. In April 2016, in the wake of class
action lawsuits involving several states that took into account Uber’s
categorization of its drivers as independent contractors, the company
reversed course and began allowing drivers to seek tips.140
A research team led by Schwieterman used data collectors to make
fifty “paired trips” between randomly selected points within a transit-rich
environment in Chicago.141 A pair of data collectors departed
simultaneously, one taking public transit and the other using UberPOOL, to
destinations between two and six miles away.142 The results show that
travel times were relatively equal on trips to and from Chicago’s central
business district, which means that few commuters are likely to use
UberPOOL every day.143 However, the time saving increases to about ten
minutes on trips originating in the “outer downtown” area and reaches
nearly twenty minutes for trips linking outlying neighborhoods.144 The
authors conclude that UberPOOL, which generally costs between seven and
ten dollars, is an attractive option for many different types of journeys,
including commuter trips that do not involve traveling to the central
business district.145 This conclusion is supported by federal
recommendations stating that analysts estimate a value on time savings in
urban trips at $24.10/hour.146
As part of the analysis for this paper, the authors reviewed the
prices of both LyftLine and UberPOOL in the same fifty markets on
136. Id. at 1000.
137. Id. at 1000-01.
138. Id. at 1001.
139. Id. at 1002.
140. Id.
141. Joseph P. Schwieterman & Matthew Michel, Have App Will Travel: Comparing
the Price & Speed of Fifty CTA & UberPool Trips in Chicago, CHADDICK INST. FOR
METROPOLITAN DEV. DEPAUL U. (June 27, 2016).
142. See id.
143. Id. at 5-8.
144. Id. at 5, 10.
145. Id. at 10.
146. Memorandum from Peter Rogoff, the Acting Under Secretary of Policy for the
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Secretarial Officers and Modal Administrators (July 9, 2014).
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weekdays during mid-day hours. The average UberPOOL price was $8.52,
compared to $10.92 for LyftLine.147 The difference in prices was
proportionately less on longer distance routes than on short ones.148
Although this analysis did not consider price difference during surge
periods, it shows that both companies offer less expensive services than
taxicab rides.

3. Policy Issues and Outlook
Many cities are working to find acceptable regulatory frameworks
for ridesourcing that are palatable for both the TNCs and consumers. Wide
differences in the regulatory environment and legal interpretations of
municipal ordinances (most of which were written long before the
emergence of Lyft and Uber) remain an impediment to expansion. Some
communities have adopted a “ban first, ask questions later” approach, while
others have avoided dealing with the sector in a formal way.149 The
resulting regulatory initiatives tend to fall into two main categories:
Complying with regulations on taxicabs: The first type of initiative
involves a push to require TNCs to comply with rate and service regulations
created for taxi operations. Many of these initiatives seek to apply licensing
and price controls that Lyft and Uber vociferously argue are incompatible
with their technological platforms, making this a high-stakes battle.150
Among the primary arguments used to justify exempting ridesourcing from
such regulation is that they provide rides that are “prearranged rides,” rather
than rides obtained through street hailing, which is common for taxicab
trips.151 In Washington State, to qualify as a prearranged trip, a chauffeur
must pick up the passenger no sooner than fifteen minutes after the request
is made—a rule not presently enforced for TNCs.152 The requirement that
TNC drivers undergo fingerprinting and comply with other regulation in
Austin, Texas, prompted both companies to immediately withdraw.153
Similar issues prompted them to pull out of Albany, Buffalo, and Syracuse,
New York.154 Other cities have struck a compromise by barring TNCs from
offering airport drop-off and pickup services in a manner similar to taxis.155
147. Joseph P. Schwieterman, Notes on the Pricing and Scope of UberPOOL, Lyft and
Skedaddle, CHADDICK INST. FOR METRO. DEV. DEPAUL UNIVERSITY, at 1 (Sept. 1, 2016) (on
file with author).
148. Id.
149. Eli Lehrer & Andrew Moylan, Embracing the Peer-Production Economy, 56
NAT’L AFF., Fall 2014, at 56.
150. Rayle et al., supra note 130, at 1.
151. Edelman & Geradin, supra note 12.
152. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 308-83-200 (2014).
153. Arun Sundararajan, What Uber and Lyft’s Austin Exit Says About the Future of
Regulation, FORTUNE (May 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/13/uber-lyft-austin/.
154. Uber, Lyft Reignite Plans to Expand into Upstate New York, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Apr. 6, 2016 4:02p.m.),
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Requiring drivers to have credentials beyond the training they
receive from TNCs: Another regulatory challenge involves rules governing
the needed qualifications to drive vehicles for commercial purposes. In
some cities, drivers for TNCs are now required to undergo formal training,
although such training often remains far less than that for traditional taxi
drivers.156 San Francisco struck a compromise by demanding that TNC
drivers obtain a business license.157 The practice of classifying drivers as
private contractors, rather than employees, has also generated litigation.158
Finally, some cities, such as New York, are exploring regulations
seeking to deal with congestion, including proposals on how TNCs wait for
customers in high-traffic areas.159 New York commissioned a traffic study
and is exploring possible caps on the number of ridesourcing vehicles
operating in parts of Manhattan and other high-density zones.160

C. Microtransit Service
This third category consists of firms in the shared-mobility sector
that offer van and bus services in a much more flexible manner than that
provided by scheduled public transport services. Microtransit revolves
around communication platforms that dramatically change how service is
delivered.161 Firms often utilize smaller vehicles and have schedules that
routinely change in response to fluctuating supply and demand.162
Microtransit blends some of the convenience of ridesourcing with the some
of the predictable aspects of public transit.163

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/2eaef95c34434c45b69404d6c4f11ae6/uber-lyft-reignite-plansexpand-upstate-ny.
155. Scott McCartney, You Can’t Take an Uber Home from These Airports, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (July 6, 2016 2:26p.m.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-cant-take-anuber-home-from-these-airports-1467829592.
156. Shaheen et al., supra note 87, at 4.
157. Georgia Wells & Douglas MacMillan, Uber, Lyft Drivers Need Business Licenses
to Operate in San Francisco, WALL ST. J. (April 15, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-lyft-drivers-need-business-licenses-to-operate-in-sanfrancisco-1460762952.
158. Kia Kokalitcheva, The Real Deal with Uber’s (Not) New Tipping Policy,
FORBES.COM (Apr. 22, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/22/uber-driver-tips-settlement/.
159. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, City’s Delayed Traffic Study to Guide Regulation of Uber
Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/nyregion/citysdelayed-traffic-study-to-guide-regulation-of-uber-vehicles.html?_r=0.
160. Id.
161. Tod Newcombe, The Sharing Economy: Ride Sharing Offers TransportationRelated Benefits, GOVTECH (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/TheSharing-Economy-Ride-Sharing-Offers-Transportation-Related-Benefits.html.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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1. Evolution and Expansion.
The growth of microtransit is drawing attention from policymakers
who had long assumed that public transit was an inherently money-losing
proposition. Almost all transit service in the United States since World War
II has been managed by government or quasi-government agencies that rely
on subsidies from federal, state, and local sources to offset deficits from
insufficient farebox revenue.164 Believing that competition would “skim the
cream” from the most lucrative routes, thereby hurting public transit
operators, many governments impose regulations that bar private
companies from establishing competing services.165 Some states, such as
Illinois, require would-be operators to hold public hearings and obtain
“Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity” before launching
microtransit services (this process can take months, if permission is granted
at all).166
Rapid advances in technology, however, are allowing entrepreneurs
to fill gaps in transit while differentiating themselves enough from public
transit operators to make it unclear whether such regulation applies to their
services. Microtransit often maintains schedules generated by
“crowdsourcing” apps and does not adhere to fixed schedules for extended
periods of time.167 Service is offered only to members, which is often
provided for free and generally provided by vans and other small
vehicles.168 Companies like Bridj, Chariot, and Via are leaders in this
category.
Chariot touts itself as “reinventing mass transit for commuters,
companies, and fun-seekers with fast, reliable, affordable, and comfortable
service.”169 This is done through a combination of flexible routing, high
frequencies, and innovative pricing that is proving to be particularly
attractive to commuters. Operating only in the San Francisco Bay Area,
Chariot places emphasis on routes to neighborhoods that suffer from poor
transit service. Most of its twenty-seven routes within the city and
neighboring suburbs link residential areas to high-density employment
areas.170 Routes are determined through a crowd-funding app with revenue
generated through commitments to buy passes, such as twelve-ride and

164. Ronald F. Kirby, Financing Public Transportation, in PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
445, 445 (George E. Gray & Lester A. Hoel eds., 1992).
165. Id. at 449.
166. Timothy Sandefur, CON Job: State “Certificate of Necessity” Laws Protect Firms,
Not Consumers, REGULATION, at 42, (Summer 2011),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/8/regv34n2-1.pdf.
167. Newcombe, supra note 161.
168. Id.
169. CHARIOT, https://www.chariot.com/ (last visited March 30, 2017).
170. See Routes, CHARIOT, https://www.chariot.com/routes (last visited Sept. 3, 2016).
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thirty-day unlimited ride passes, once a route is established.171 Generally,
125 to 200 riders must “buy in” for a route to be established.172
Some Chariot routes, such as its popular route to Glassdoor’s office
in Mill Valley, California, are employer-sponsored.173 Only those employed
by this prominent human resources firm can use this route.174 Although data
on these services is limited, users may find travel times to be markedly less
than those for local public transit buses, but similar to express or skip-stop
public transit service. The appeal of such limited-stop schedules encourages
users to pay more than they would for a regular public bus.
Bridj employs a similar business model but serves more cities,
operating in Boston and Kansas City, Missouri.175 The firm’s routes
nonetheless are confined to relatively small geographic areas within these
locales and concentrate on linking specific neighborhoods that it feels need
to be “bridged.”176 Before making a booking, users are provided with a
price, time, and approximate pickup location.177 After booking, they are
given a pickup time and a more exact pickup spot at which they should
wait.178 Similar to public buses, groups of users are requested to congregate
at a common location to save time, yet—unlike public transit services—all
are guaranteed seats and provided an estimated arrival time that is
continuously adjusted.179
Both companies price their services similarly, with Chariot having
a $5.00 rate for peak-period rides and a $3.80 rate during off-peak periods,
while also offering a variety of monthly passes including a popular “all
access” pass ($119/month).180 Bridj touts that its prices are close to public
transit fares, generally being in the $1.50-$7.00 range.181
Another company, Via, operates in Chicago, New York, and
Washington, D.C.182 Like Bridj and Chariot, Via promotes itself as a
service that “essentially combines the cheap, communal ride of a bus with
something close to the door-to-door service of a cab.”183 Although its
171. See Crowdfunding, CHARIOT, https://www.chariot.com/crowdfundings (last visited
Mar. 30, 2017).
172. Id.
173. Glassdoor Mill Valley – Private Route, CHARIOT,
https://www.chariot.com/line/glassdoor/pm (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
174. Id.
175. BRIDJ, http://www.bridj.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
176. See Ryan Lawler, Bridj Raises $4M, Hires Former Chicago & DC Transport
Head Gabe Klein to Reinvent Your Commute, TECH CRUNCH (Sept. 4, 2014),
https://techcrunch.com/2014/09/04/bridj/.
177. FAQ, BRIDJ, http://www.bridj.com/faq (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Pricing, CHARIOT, https://www.chariot.com/pricing (last visited Mar. 29,
2017).
181. See FAQ, BRIDJ, http://www.bridj.com/faq (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
182. VIA, https://ridewithvia.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
183. Matthew Flamm, Yet Another Ride Service. Only This One Is Different, CRAINS
NEW YORK BUS. (May 24, 2015, 12:01 AM),
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service is flexible, travelers are directed to specified curbside locations to
allow drivers to service several passengers at each stop, thereby lowering
travel times.184 An important difference between Via and its two peers,
however, is that it stresses ultra-low fares to compete with other shared
mobility providers, such as UberPool.185 In two cities, Via offers one-way
pricing as low as $2.15, which undercuts even public transit.186
A more specialized startup, Scoot, is a point-to-point electric
scooter sharing service.187 With stations throughout San Francisco, it
advertises as being “as fast as taxis, as cheap as the bus, and as fun as your
bike.”188 The firm makes the process simple and predictable by having
designated parking spots.189 Although little has been published about this
service and its popularity is affected greatly by the weather, it appears to
primarily cater to those making trips that are only a few miles long and
would take a half-hour or less on public transit. Still, Scoot stands out for its
flexibility. Consumers can change destinations at any point, making it
similar to the on-the-go nature of bikesharing.190

2. Notable Research
Little scholarly research exists on microtransit. The Shared-Use
Mobility Center describes Bridj and Chariot as “private shuttle services” for
customers who are willing to pay slightly higher prices in exchange for
added comfort and service.191 The Center also concludes that, “Dynamic
route-generating technology used by many of these services also has
tremendous potential for transit and para-transit services.”192 The Ford
Motor Company reported that Bridj had a fleet of 100 vehicles and
considerable expansion potential upon acquiring the company in September
2016.193
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20150524/TRANSPORTATION/150529933/yetanother-ride-service-only-this-one-is-different.
184. Id.
185. Sage Lazzaro, You Need to Try Via—An Ulta-Cheap Uber Competitor Now
Offering $2 Ride, OBSERVER (Aug. 1, 2016, 11:37 AM), http://observer.com/2016/08/youneed-to-try-via-an-ulta-cheap-uber-competitor-now-offering-2-rides/.
186. Id.
187. See What is Scoot, SCOOT, https://scoot.co/what-is-scoot/ (last visited Mar. 4,
2017).
188. Id.
189. FAQ, SCOOT, https://scoot.co/faq/#locations-384 (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
190. See What is Scoot, SCOOT, https://scoot.co/what-is-scoot/ (last visited Mar.4,
2017).
191. Shared Use Mobility Reference Guide, SHARED USE MOBILITY CENTER 1, 11
(2016), http://sharedusemobilitycenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/SharedUseMobility_ReferenceGuide_09.25.2015.pdf.
192. Id.
193. Ford Buys Shuttle Service as Part of New Mobility Push, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept.
9, 2016), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/ford-buys-shuttle-service-part-newmobility-push (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
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3. Policy Issues and Outlook
Microtransit operators face a delicate balancing act in trying to
demonstrate that they enhance mobility and environmental goals while
avoiding the appearance of being bona fide transit operators. Looming over
them is the specter of government action to shut them down by applying
regulation that is designed to preserve the monopoly status of public transit
operators. In some cities, authorities could require that microtransit
operators receive Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity to
remain in operation.
Bus services such as Bridj and Chariot are particularly vulnerable
due to their status as companies that operate a transportation service—they
own the vehicles and hire the drivers, much like transit companies—rather
than simply maintaining communication platforms. The requirement that
passengers register on the firms’ websites to become members, however,
insulates them somewhat from regulatory challenges.194 Yet, microtransit
faces some of the same threats as Lyft and Uber related to the applicability
of taxicab regulations, making the future difficult to predict. A smaller firm,
Leap, received a cease-and-desist from the California Public Utilities
Commission after starting operations before it had all of the necessary
licenses from the state.195

D. Crowdsourced Intercity Bus Operators
This final category involves firms that facilitate intercity trips, i.e.,
those that extend beyond the limits of a metropolitan region. Like
microtransit, the participants in this sector seek to establish viable routes
through crowdsourcing and compete heavily with private car travel.196
Rather than operating routes served by public transit, however, they
compete with intercity buses, Amtrak, and commercial airlines.197 Rally
Bus198 and Skedaddle199 are the most prominent operators in this sector.

1. Evolution and Expansion
For many years, the federal government considered bus service
akin to a public utility, controlled how carriers entered and exited interstate
194. See Kim-Mai Cutler, The Last Bus Startup Standing: Chariot, TECH CRUNCH (Nov.
29, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/11/29/the-last-bus-startup-standing-chariot/.
195. Id.
196. Lauren Fischer & Joseph Schwieterman, The Decline and Recovery of Intercity
Bus Service in the United States: A Comeback for an Environmentally Friendly
Transportation Mode, 13 ENVTL. PRAC., no. 2, 2011, at 13.
197. Id.
198. RALLY, http://rallybus.net (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
199. SKEDADDLE, https://www.letskedaddle.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
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routes, and regulated the prices carriers charged.200 Additional regulation as
intrastate routes—those confined to a single state—was enforced by state
governments.201 By the mid-1970s, however, the intercity bus industry was
struggling, and governments everywhere recognized the need for reform.202
The rate of car ownership in the U.S. had risen to more than eighty percent,
and airlines were experimenting with steeply discounted fares.203 Many
small-town bus routes were dropped, leaving many communities without
service.204
The industry’s partial deregulation through the Bus Regulatory
Reform Act in 1982 afforded the industry new marketing freedoms.205 The
Act relieved the industry of federal controls on pricing and routes and
provided a mechanism for bus companies to appeal regulations imposed
upon them by state governments on intrastate routes.206 Still, many
intrastate regulations remained in place and continue today. This makes it
possible to operate from, for example, Atlanta, Georgia, to Jacksonville,
Florida, without the need for governmental permission, while still needing
to obtain permission and comply with rate and schedule regulations on instate trips from Atlanta to Augusta.207
The industry’s long retrenchment culminated in the bankruptcy of
Greyhound and cutbacks by many smaller carriers, including various
Trailways lines, before the sector experienced a turnaround in the early
2000s.208 Bus service for relatively short distance routes began to attract a
new customer base, often travelers who were less attached to the car than
their predecessors.209 Particularly brisk expansion occurred among
“Chinatown operators” linking the Chinatown districts in Manhattan with
Boston and Washington, D.C.210 These operators often operated in a legal
“grey area,” failing to keep adequate records on vehicle maintenance or
employee service hours and most did not publish printed timetables.211
The recovery began slowly and entered a new era when several
city-to-city express operators—including Megabus, which began in the
200. William E. Thoms, Unleashing the Greyhounds - The Bus Regulatory Reform Act
of 1982, 6 CAMPBELL L. REV. 75, 95-96 (1984).
201. Id. at 96.
202. Fischer & Schwieterman, supra note 197, at 8.
203. Id.
204. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-92-126, SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION: THE AVAILABILITY OF INTERCITY BUS SERVICE CONTINUES TO DECLINE
(June 1992).
205. Act of Sept. 20, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (1982).
206. See id.
207. For an example of such regulation, see What Do I Need?, G.A. DEP’T OF PUB.
SAFETY, http://www.gamccd.net/LPCWhatDoINeed.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).
208. Fischer & Schwieterman, supra note 197, at 8.
209. See id.
210. Nicholas Klein, Emergent Curbside Intercity Bus Industry: Chinatown and
Beyond, TRANSP. & RES. REC., vol. 2111, 2009, at 83.
211. Fischer & Schwieterman, supra note 197, at 8.
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Midwest in 2006212—entered the fray. Megabus soon expanded to most
heavily-populated regions of the country and relied heavily on “curbside”
pickup and drop-off rather than using conventional stations.213 BoltBus,
Vamoose, and other carriers expanded in the Eastern United States.214
Sensing the timing was right for large-scale investments, major capital
flowed into the intercity travel sector.
These developments dramatically improved the public image of
intercity bus travel.215 In the wake of this comeback came the development
of technological platforms that allowed bus services to set schedules
through crowdsourcing.216 If enough travelers expressed a willingness to
pay, a bus would operate between two points on a particular day.217 Rally
Bus and Skedaddle emerged as market leaders in this category, both
allowing the individual who launches the bus trip to travel for free if
enough other riders sign up.218 The fares rise as the number of reservations
increases.219 If the trip fails to attract enough riders, it does not operate and
no fares are collected.220

2. Notable Research.
The wide body of research on intercity bus service contrasts sharply
with the paucity of technical analysis that exists on crowdsourced routes.221
As part of the research for the present study, the authors tracked a number
of routes advertised by Skedaddle. The firm’s number of routes (not all of
which attracted enough riders to go “live”) was found to vary widely by
season. The analysis identified 242 routes on June 15, 2016, but just fiftysix routes on September 16, 2016, which suggests that there may be wide
month-by-month variation.222 Although most routes involve travel to
festivals, musical and sporting events, and other cultural activities, some
resemble intercity services, with some trips even leaving from locations
advertised as near the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York.223 At
present, however, this sector should be regarded only as an infant industry.
212. Id. at 10.
213. Id. at 7, 12.
214. Id. at 8; see VAMOOSE, http://www.vamoosebus.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
215. Fischer & Schwieterman, supra note 197, at 10.
216. See FAQ, RALLY, http://rallybus.net/FAQ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017); About Us,
SKEDADDLE, https://www.letskedaddle.com/about (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. FAQ, SKEDADDLE, https://www.letskedaddle.com/faq (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
220. See FAQ, RALLY, http://rallybus.net/FAQ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017); FAQ,
SKEDADDLE, https://www.letskedaddle.com/faq (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
221. See Surface Transportation: The Availability of Intercity Bus Service Continues to
Decline, supra note 205.
222. Schwieterman, supra note 147, at 2.
223. See Events, SKEDADDLE, https://www.letskedaddle.com/events (last visited Mar.
30, 2017).
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3. Policy Issues and Outlook.
Crowdsourced intercity bus operators are more effectively buffered
from regulatory threats than TNCs and microtransit service.224 Their focus
on city-to-city service and similarities on what is commonly regarded as
“charter bus service” allows them to sidestep most bureaucratic hurdles.225
Moreover, by “work[ing] with only the highest quality professional bus
operators in your area” the company seeks to avoid concerns that it keeps
costs low by compromising safety.226 In the past, there have been notorious
regulatory crackdowns that have resulted in the shutdown on many
Chinatown bus lines.227 Similarly, by avoiding routes confined to an urban
area, these operators do not face the aforementioned issues regarding
competition with public transportation.228
As the sector grows, however, it will likely need to confront
challenges associated with curbside pickup and drop-off. In Boston, for
example, such regulation prevents carriers from operating from the city’s
Chinatown district, which has prompted most scheduled intercity bus lines
in the city to use the South Station Bus Terminal, which requires a usage
fee.229 In New York, curbside operators operating on advertised schedules
must obtain permits to serve a specific location.230 As the quantity of
crowdfunded bus service grows, it may be only a matter of time before
authorities push for operators to comply with such regulations or,
ultimately, move arrivals and departures to off-street locations. This sector
may also encounter resistance from more established bus lines who regard
newer firms as “below the radar” operators that skirt regulation. Still, at
present, the prospect of such challenges seems speculative. Skedaddle and
other firms remain small and largely regarded as high-tech charter lines that
remain free of much of the regulation that Greyhound, Megabus, and other
lines face.

224. See Melissa Dobstaff, Beyond City Limits, Ride Sharing with Skedaddle, J. HIGH
TECH. L. BLOG (Feb. 14, 2017), https://sites.suffolk.edu/jhtl/2017/02/14/beyond-city-limitsride-sharing-with-skedaddle/.
225. Id.
226. See Arrive in Style, SKEDADDLE, https://www.letskedaddle.com/ (last visited Mar.
4, 2017).
227. Patrick McGeehan, Federal Officials Shut Down 26 Bus Operators, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/nyregion/federal-officials-shut-down-26bus-operators.html.
228. See Cutler, supra note 195.
229. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & AMANDA M. BURDEN, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY
PLANNING TRANSP. DIV., CHINATOWN BUS STUDY, 22-23 (October 2009),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb3/downloads/cb3docs/chinatown_final_report.pdf.
230. Intercity Bus Permits, NEW YORK DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/ferrybus/intercity-bus.shtml (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
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II. TYPOLOGY AND CONCLUSIONS
The remarkable innovation, expansion, and increasing financial
viability of shared-mobility firms in cities suggests that collaborative
consumption will continue to reshape the structure of urban transportation
in profound ways. Each of the sectors profiled are scalable due to their
smoothly functioning communication platforms. The enormous popularity
of Lyft and Uber suggests that consumers are quick learners when it comes
to experimenting with new mobility options. As these and other app-based
mobility services grow more prevalent, policymakers and legal analysts will
need to confront issues that were difficult to imagine only a few years ago.
To illustrate the different types of shared mobility available in the
marketplace, it is useful to review the differing qualities and strategic
orientations of the participating firms discussed in this study (Table 1
below). As Table 1 shows, among seven categories of firms, four have
business-to-consumer orientations, while two are best regarded as having a
peer-to-peer focus. Five firms—Bridj, Rally Bus, Skedaddle, Scoot, and
Via—operate their own vehicles, while others use contractors to provide the
transportation service. Only in the case of carsharing is the consumer
behind the wheel.
Table 1 also shows the major regulatory challenges that each sector
now faces—or may soon face—as well as the mode of transportation that it
is most apt to replace. The final column identifies those modes that tend to
accent existing transport modes (rather than replace them), by providing a
“first/last mile” solution (such as linking a user’s place of residence with a
transit stop).
For example, the table shows that car2go, Enterprise, Zipcar, and
other carsharing companies follow a business-to-consumer model and are
among the few in the shared-mobility space that are vehicle providers. For
these companies, taxes and rules governing car rentals loom largely, as do
policy challenges. The firms also primarily attract consumers who would
otherwise own private vehicles and are not seen as prominent “first/last
mile” solutions.
These results show the breadth of policy issues and research
questions raised by the growth of the shared-mobility sector. The policy
issues facing ridesourcing providers, like Lyft and Uber, as well as
microtransit operators, like Bridj and Chariot, appear most problematic,
while those offering crowdfunded intercity bus services seem to be the least
severe. Among this list, carsharing stands out for being the only sector
taxed at a retail level, an issue that appears to be more problematic as
competition intensifies.
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TABLE 1: Mobility Providers in
(Listed in Order Presented in this Report)

the

137
Sharing

Economy

Interpreted broadly, the analysis in this paper shows that the shared
mobility sector is extraordinarily diverse but broadly divisible into four
categories. For all of the excitement and potential surrounding these firms,
however, it is important to keep in mind that, aside from Lyft and Uber,
almost all others operate at a relatively small scale. Carsharing is only a
small percentage of the size of the car rental market.231 Microtransit appears
to barely account for one decimal point in the overall ridership of the
country’s public transit system.232 Scoot operates in only one city, while

231. Susan A. Shaheen & Adam P. Cohen, Carsharing and Personal Vehicle Services:
Worldwide Market Developments and Emerging Trends, 7 INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABLE TRANSP.
(2013) at 2.
232. Chariot has reported that it carries about 40,000 passengers per month in the San
Francisco Bay Area, whereas the public transit system carries well over a million unlinked
daily trips in that region. See Cutler, supra note 195.
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Skedaddle is much smaller than the dozens of charter bus operators that run
in the same geographic regions.
All this nonetheless raises important questions that will affect the
policymaking process. Will shared mobility reach such a scale that
governments will make special accommodations and provide exemptions
from regulation, perhaps in response to a public that has grown dependent
upon them? Will the legal distinctions between these sectors become
increasingly blurred as more innovation occurs, making policymaking
challenges even more complex? Finally, will shared mobility mostly serve
as an enhancement to public transit or will these different realms of
transportation find themselves on a collision course? The answers will
affect the public response to a sector that has pushed urban travel in
directions that would have been difficult to imagine just a generation ago.

